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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ATTACHMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION-REVOCATION
OF CITIZENSHIP--[Federal].-Petitioner, a Russian immigrant, was ad-
mitted to United States citizenship in 1927 by a proper court upon satis-
factory evidence that he had complied with United States naturalization
requirements. In 1939, pursuant to statute,' a proceeding was begun by
the United States government to set aside Petitioner's citizenship on the
ground that it had been illegally procured in that Petitioner was not at
the time of his naturalization, and during the statutory period preceding it,
attached to the principles of the United States Constitution, but had been
a member of certain Communist organizations and had subscribed to and
promulgated their doctrines.2 The United States Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a decree issued by a United States District Court cancelling
Petitioner's certificate of citizenship. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, that the judgment of the Courts below must be reversed. Petitioner's
membership and activity in the Communist party at the time of his natural-
ization, and during the statutory period preceding, was not incompatible
with his attachment to the Constitution, and support of its principles.
Schneidernn v. United States.3
The granting of citizenship to a petitioning alien is a privilege con-
ferred upon him by the United States government, and subject to whatever
conditions Congress may impose. 4 A primary condition is that the petitioner
during the statutory residence period must have behaved as a person of
good moral character, attached to the principles of the United States Con-
stitution, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States.5 It follows that a subsequent finding that this condition was not
fulfilled may constitute such illegality as will warrant cancellation of his
certificate of citizenship. 6
Whether Petitioner's mere membership and activity in Communist organ-
izations, as bearing upon his belief and conduct during the probative
1. Nationality Code (1906) 34 Stat. 601, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 405.
2. During the five years preceding his naturalization, Petitioner was a
member of the Young Workers (Communist) League in Los Angeles. In
1925, he became a member of the Workers Party, the predecessor of the
Communist Party in the United States. While the original complaint
charged fraudulent procurement on the ground that Petitioner concealed
his Communist affiliations from the naturalizing court, the present action
was pressed on the ground of illegal procurement.
3. (1943) 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. ed. 1249 (Justices Douglas and Rutledge
concurring; Chief Justice Stone, and Justice Roberts and Frankfurter dis-
senting. Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision.)
4. United States v. Macintosh (1931) 283 U. S. 605; Tutun v. United
States (1926) 270 U. S. 568; United States v. Williams (1904) 194 U. S.
279.
5. (1906) 34 Stat. 598.
6. When prescribed qualifications have no existence in fact, cancella-
tion is warranted on the basis of illegal procurement. Tutun v. United
States (1926) 270 U. S. 568.
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statutory period, alone constituted such illegality, was the question posed
in the present case, and one novel to the Supreme Court. Other federal
courts, in deciding the few cases that have arisen presenting a substan-
tially similar issue, have found adherence to Communist doctrine incom-
patible with attachment to the Constitution7 The most recent of these cases
was United States v. Tapolcsanyi.8 In that case, the defendant, in the
year following his naturalization, wrote to his brother in Hungary that
"he had been for the past eight years a pure, red Communist" and did
not believe in representative government. The Court found that such
beliefs, entertained during the statutory period before his petition for
citizenship, were incompatible with attachment to the principles of the
Constitution; that defendant had fraudulently acquired his certificate by
falsely alleging attachment to the Constitution.
Against this background, the holding in the present case stands in sharp
contrast; but it would be error to assume that the ruling is authority for
the proposition that adherence to Communist doctrine presents no con-
flict with attachment to the Constitution. The Court did not attempt, either
expressly or by implication, to project its ruling beyond the particular
facts of the case. It was concerned, solely with determining the actual
political philosophy held by Petitioner, rather than that which might
be imputed to him from his Communist membership. It is this careful
distinction which gives strength to the Court's decision.
Petitioner's life and conduct was subjected to the closest scrutiny. He
was found to be law-abiding; his record was unmarred by previous arrests;
and at no time was he known either by an oral statement or a statement
in writing to have advocated the forcible overthrow of our government.
Impressed by Petitioner's deportment during the statutory period, one is
respectful toward the suggestion made by the Court that the statutory
criterion laid down by Congress is not attachment to the Constitution, in
the subjective sense of a test of belief, but behavior for the statutory period
as a man attached to the principles of the Constitution,9 an objective re-
quirement which Petitioner clearly satisfied.
7. The Communist Party in the United States did not come into exis-
tence until 1921 (then called the Workers Party). But in United States v.
Olsson (1912) 196 Fed. 562, concealment from the naturalization court of
socialist belief was found to justify cancellation of citizenship. The basis
of denaturalization in United States v. Swelgin (1918) 254 Fed. 884 was
defendant's admission of adherence to the principles of the I. W. W.
8. (C. C. A. 3, 1930) 40 F. (2d), 255.
9. (1906) 34 Stat. 598 provides, "It shall be made to appear to the satis-
faction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately
preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the
United States five years at least ... and that during that time he has
behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order
and happiness of the same." The court concedes, however, that United
States v. Schwimmer (1929) 279 U. S. 644 and United States v. Macintosh(1931) 283 U. S. 605, have held that the statute imports that an applicant
for citizenship under the Act of 1906 "must not only behave as a man
attached to the principles of the Constitution, but must be attached in fact
at the time of naturalization." Nevertheless, emphasis is placed upon the
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Accepting for purpose of argument, that an applicant under the 1906
Act must not only behave as a man attached to the Constitution, but must
be so attached in fact, the Court sought to reconcile the fact of Petitioner's
Communistic affiliations at the time of his naturalization with the required
attachment to Constitutional principles. Illustrative of the Court's en-
deavor is the harmonizing of the absolutism, commonly associated with
Communism, with our Constitutional mandate of representative govern-
ment. Reconciliation is made on the ground that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat" meant to Petitioner "not a government, but a state of things"
in which "the majority of the people shall readily direct their own des-
tinies and use the instrument of the State for these truly democratic ends."
The Court concludes that Petitioner's testimonial of belief was not so in-
compatible with the philosophy of the Constitution as to warrant a "clear,
unequivocal and convincing finding"'1 that the naturalization court could
not have been satisfied that the petitioner was attached to the principles
of the Constitution when he was naturalized.
During the District Court's hearing," testimony was given that the
Communist Party, during the probative period of Petitioner's behavior, had
as an ultimate aim the overthrow of the capitalistic government in the
United States, the barring from franchise of certain minority groups, and
the abolition of the Supreme Court itself. There was evidence presented
which flatly repudiated these charges as false, and branded others as dis-
tortifns of the Party's program. Whether, upon an evaluation of all the
evidence, the finding could be justified that, during the probative period
of Petitioner's behavior, certain principles were so inalienably associated
with the Communist organizations to which Petitioner belonged, and were
so irreconcilably in conflict with American constitutional principles, that
Petitioner could not be legally heard to disassociate himself from them
by his own construction of their significance, would appear to be an Issue
on which reasonable men might well differ. The Court selected that of
two possibilities which it believed comported most strongly with the "spirit
of freedom and tolerance in which our nation was founded," and refused
to impute to Petitioner any reprehensible interpretation of any organiza-
tion and its program which were not personally his. A. L. B,.
statement of the late Chief Justice Hughes in his dissent in the Macintosh
case that the behavior requirement should be construed in accord with the
theory of our government in relation to freedom of conscience.
10. In a denaturalization proceeding, it is a judgment which is subject
to attack, and the government must prove lack of attachment by evidence
which does not leave the issue in doubt. United States v. Rovin (D. C.
E. D. Mich., 1926) 12 F. (2d) 942; United States v. Der Manelian (D. C.
D. R. I. 1941) 39 Fed. Supp. 959.
11. The government called as witnesses a former member of the Com-
munist Party, and a police officer at one time in charge of the Los Angeles
radical squad, as well as the Petitioner, and introduced in evidence numer-
ous documents and papers, purporting to be expositions of Communist doc-
trine. The Petitioner testified in his own behalf, presented transcripts of
testimony of two University professors given at another proceeding, and
introduced in evidence other documents and papers purporting to be de-
clarative of Communist doctrine and principles.
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